China’s new zero-tariff regime for African exports gives South Africa a timely opportunity to expand trade, upgrade its export base, and deepen commercial links with the world’s second-largest economy. Yet preferential access alone will not determine the outcome. Pretoria’s ability to convert this opening into durable economic gains will depend on whether it can overcome domestic constraints, strengthen competitiveness, and position South African exporters effectively within an increasingly crowded African race for Chinese market share.

On the 1^st May 2026, a shipment of 24 tonnes of apples from South Africa cleared customs in Shenzhen, a port city in South China, with the tariff reduced from 10% to nil. Around the same time, in central China’s Hunan Province, over 6,000 bottles of South African wine passed through customs at the Changsha International airport, benefiting from a tax reduction of USD 3,094.

South Africa is not alone. On the same day, a batch of 516 tonnes of oranges from Egypt and 24 tonnes of avocados from Kenya entered China via Shanghai.

Modest in scale, these are hardly headline-grabbing trade figures. However, they offer an early glimpse into what China’s new tariff regime for African exports could mean for countries such as South Africa. These shipments are the first test cases of China’s zero-tariff policy, which covers 53 of Africa’s 54 countries – the exception being Eswatini due to its formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

Initially rolled out in December 2024 for 33 least developed countries (“LDCs”) in Africa, the scheme has since been expanded to include another 20 African states, effective from May 2026 to April 2028. As a unilateral move, it requires no reciprocal tariff reductions on Chinese goods from African nations.

Zero-Tariff Treatment and the African Continent

Zero-tariff treatment for African countries is not a Beijing invention. In 2000, the US Congress passed the African Growth and Opportunity Act (“AGOA”), allowing 32 Sub-Saharan countries to export products to America duty-free. The programme expired in September 2025 and was renewed for the fifth time until the end of 2026. The European Union follows a similar path, granting tariff-free and quota-free access to 33 LDCs, and has signed various Economic Partnership Agreements (“EPAs”) with others across the continent.

China’s approach, however, differs from its Western counterparts in both scale and conditionality. By extending zero-tariff treatment to 53 African states, China has become the first major economy to offer near continent-wide preferential market access to Africa. Unlike AGOA, which tied eligibility to criteria such as progress in market liberalisation, the rule of law and human rights, China’s framework comes with almost no strings attached. Beijing’s message seems simple: trade first, politics later — if at all.

Since surpassing the United States in 2009 to become Africa’s largest trading partner, Beijing has consolidated its economic footprint across the continent. Yet this relationship has also been characterised by a persistent and widening trade imbalance. In 2025, the total trade reached USD 348 billion, while Africa’s trade deficit widened to a record USD 102 billion.

In this context, the expansion of zero-tariff treatment serves three purposes for Beijing. First, the two-year implementation period acts as both a temporary buffer and an incentive for ongoing negotiations regarding the China-Africa Economic Partnership for Shared Development (“CADEPA”), which seeks to institutionalise cooperation in trade, investment, industrialisation, and market access. Second, the initiative allows Beijing to contrast itself with a protectionist United States under the second Trump administration, presenting China as the more open, dependable, and pragmatic partner for the Global South. Third, there is Eswatini. As the only African state that recognises Taiwan diplomatically, Eswatini’s omission from the new tariff regime indicates the geopolitical limits of Beijing’s economic generosity. This move also narrows Taiwan’s diplomatic space both on the continent and within the Global South.

Sino-South African Relations

For sixteen consecutive years, South Africa has been China’s largest trading partner on the African continent. In 2025, South African exports to China exceeded USD 13.5 billion, consisting predominantly of raw materials such as iron ore, platinum group metals (“PGMs”), manganese, and coal. As the most advanced economy on the continent, it is also the top destination for Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) stock in Africa, which surpassed USD 11.7 billion. Nevertheless, Chinese greenfield investment has slowed down sharply, falling to just USD 650 million between 2020 and 2025, raising questions about whether Beijing still sees Pretoria as the industrial gateway to Africa it once envisioned.

Meanwhile, the bilateral economic relationship has increasingly reflected a mixture of friction and cooperation. The influx of Chinese manufactured goods has raised concerns among domestic industries regarding price competitiveness and deindustrialisation. ArcelorMittal South Africa, the country’s steel giant, has shut down its long-steel plants last year due to a combination of soaring electricity costs, weak local demand, unreliable rail freight systems, and low-priced imports, which affected approximately 3,500 jobs. Imports now account for roughly 36% of South Africa’s steel consumption, with Chinese steel comprising nearly three-quarters of them due largely to price advantage. In response, Pretoria imposed anti-dumping duties of 74.98% on Chinese steel in March 2026.

These tensions extend beyond the steel sector. As the country’s automatic trade deficit with China reached approximately USD 3.5 billion last year, Pretoria is considering imposing 50% tariff rates on Chinese cars. In addition, the government is seeking new measures to attract Chinese automakers such as Chery to establish factories inside South Africa in an attempt to create jobs and reduce import dependence.

Nevertheless, economic coordination between the two countries has continued. In February, South Africa’s Minister of Trade, Industry, and Competition, Parks Tau, and China’s Minister of Commerce, Wang Wen Tao, signed the Framework Agreement on Economic Partnership for Shared Prosperity (“CAEPA”), followed by an Early Harvest Agreement in March. The agreement focuses on increasing Chinese investment, granting zero-tariff treatment to South African exports in the Chinese market, and enhancing cooperation in sectors such as mining, agriculture, renewable energy, and technology.

The strengthening of ties between Beijing and Pretoria should also be situated within South Africa’s foreign policy orientation since the end of apartheid in 1994. Following its accession to the BRICS in 2010, Pretoria gradually aligned itself with emerging powers like China, advocating for a more multipolar international order. At the same time, it has simultaneously sought to preserve political and economic ties with the West.

However, this strategy of ‘walking on two tracks’ has proven increasingly difficult to sustain amid intensifying great power competition in a more fragmented and transactional world. Pretoria maintained a non-alignment position regarding the war in Ukraine and has abstained from several UN resolutions condemning Russia. At the same time, its genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice and its vocal support for Palestinian statehood led to criticisms in Washington D.C., including calls from several congressmen to reconsider South Africa’s eligibility under AGOA. Relations with the United States were strained further by South Africa’s ties with Iran. Historically, Tehran’s support for the anti-apartheid movement contributed to enduring goodwill between the two states. In January 2026, South Africa hosted naval drills with BRICS allies, including Iran, off the coast of Cape Town. After the outbreak of the Iran War, Pretoria rejected pressure from the Trump administration to downgrade relations with Tehran.

The deterioration in relations between Pretoria and Washington D.C. extends beyond diplomatic spats. The Trump administration imposed a 30% tariff on South African imports last August and increased the refugee admissions ceiling by 10,000 in May to allow South Africans of Afrikaner ethnicity to come to the United States, citing supposed unjust racial discrimination against them in the majority-Black country. Trump is a strong proponent of the ‘white genocide’ conspiracy theory regarding South Africa, going as far as ‘ambushing’ the South African President Cyril Ramaphosa about this during the latter’s visit to the Oval Office in May 2025. Should this trend persist, growing friction with Washington D.C. will likely accelerate South Africa’s economic and geopolitical convergence with China.

Opportunities and Challenges for Pretoria

The zero-tariff policy brings significant economic opportunities to South Africa in three aspects. The first is the potential for export expansion. Large corporations are likely to benefit first, as they can increase export volumes through existing trade channels and established logistics networks. At the same time, the lower barriers to entry into the Chinese market means small and medium-sized enterprises (“SMEs”) can improve profit margins and compete more effectively. Second, beyond mere expansion, the new trade environment also opens a window for product upgrading within South Africa’s export structure. Duty-free access is likely to incentivise local businesses to move up the value chain toward branded, packaged, and niche-market products tailored for Chinese consumer demand. The third opportunity lies in the prospect for South Africa to integrate into supply chains extending into and out of China. In the long term, zero-tariff access could catalyse a reconfiguration of South Africa’s position within China-centred production and consumption networks — both regionally and globally.

Certain sectors are especially well positioned to benefit from the removal of tariff barriers. For instance, with its duty decreased from 14% to zero, South Africa’s wine industry will likely gain improved competitiveness against established exporters such as Australia and Chile within the Chinese market. Likewise, the nut industry stands to benefit substantially, given that China already absorbs 90% of the country’s pecan exports and 50% of its macadamias. Reduced tariffs will therefore increase profitability within pre-existing export channels rather than requiring the creation of new markets. This also holds true for citrus and deciduous fruit sectors, where lower landed costs are likely to improve the competitiveness of products such as grapes and plums. Finally, the zero-tariff policy carves a new path for seafood products—such as rock lobster and squid—and niche agricultural goods like rooibos tea, to enter Chinese retail stores and supermarkets.

In addition, the expansion of trade relations with China will likely create secondary opportunities across sectors associated with trade facilitation and cross-border commercial activities. Financial services firms, logistics providers, and regulatory intermediaries will benefit from increased demand for expertise in areas such as customs compliance, certification standards, and currency risk management. As trade becomes more technically demanding, these sectors may assume greater importance within South Africa’s economic landscape. In this sense, the zero-tariff arrangement could stimulate forms of economic diversification that extend beyond the export sectors themselves, while simultaneously fostering South Africa’s integration into transnational commercial systems shaped increasingly by China’s economic influence.

Equally important are the implications for Pretoria’s regional and continental position. Relative to many least-developed African economies that continue to face infrastructural and productive restrictions, the continent’s most advanced economy retains comparatively mature commercial, financial, and logistical capabilities. This may allow Johannesburg, in particular, to consolidate its role as a coordination hub for regional exports destined for China. The existing channels such as the China (Shenzhen Longhua) – South Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation Conference can further link Shenzhen’s manufacturing ecosystem with Johannesburg’s commercial infrastructure. Such developments point not only to enhanced trade flows, but also to the prospect of increased Chinese investment in manufacturing facilities within South Africa itself, with production aimed at both Chinese and third-country markets.

Yet the ability of Pretoria to fully capitalise on these opportunities remains constrained by a range of challenges. Low fixed investment levels, which have remained subdued since the 2008 global financial crisis, continue to undermine the country’s productive capacity. With slow economic growth, high inflation, and one third of South Africans out of work, the Government of National Unity struggles to restore confidence in the economy. Meanwhile, logistical inefficiencies linger such as congestion at ports, rising electricity costs, and rolling blackouts – all leading to higher costs and hampering the country’s competitiveness.

In addition to the domestic obstacles, agricultural exporters also face stringent sanitary and phytosanitary standards imposed by Chinese customs, which still remains a hurdle for a USD 1.8 billion beef export opportunity. Non-agricultural exporters similarly confront unfamiliar regulatory systems and compliance obligations that may prove difficult, particularly for SMEs that lack the financial resources and technical expertise. Moreover, Pretoria faces competition from 52 other African states – many of which produce similar agricultural commodities such as apples and citrus – for Chinese market share.

Therefore, the success to utilise tariff liberalisation will depend on Pretoria’s capacity to address domestic deficiencies while strategically situating itself within an increasingly competitive African export landscape shaped by China’s evolving economic interactions with the African continent.